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The article examines the relationship of biopower and cinema through the analysis of a specific film, Hans
Weingartner’s The Edukators (2004). It argues that in the age of biopower, resistance to power cannot be
conceived of in terms of a radical outside to power. Rather, biopolitical resistance must take place on the
terrain of this power itself, that is, within the field of life. Therefore, what we call the “viral” politics of The
Edukators must be interpreted precisely in this context. The film argues that the exhaustion of political
paradigms inherited from the past century forces us to take the logic of biopower seriously. It presents a dual
critique of the neoliberal exploitation of life and the politics of death that defines contemporary terrorism. In
place of these two, it offers the audience the model of a certain “biopolitical education” that imagines
resistance as fully immanent to the field of power.
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Biopolitical Education: The Edukators and the Politics of the Immanent Outside
Marco Abel and Roland Végső
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Over the last couple of decades, the concepts of biopower and biopolitics
have emerged as omnipresent, if not quite indispensable, tools for the
interpretation of our historical present. The assumption that our history is the
history of biopower appears to be the tacit common denominator of many
attempts to come to terms with the current global situation. In fact, the heuristic
power of these categories has proven to be so strong that they have been used to
explain the political catastrophes of the twentieth century as well as the current
“global war on terror.” Not surprisingly, then, the proliferation of these attempts
to understand power in terms of “life” has necessarily led to an increased
preoccupation with the precise meaning of these terms. Given how elusive
seemingly simple terms like “life” and “power” are, it might not be an
exaggeration to state that the idea of biopower itself is well on its way to
becoming a genuinely overdetermined category. But what remains common to the
different definitions and usages of the term is the basic Foucauldian assumption
that the moment when power takes life as its object, politics itself moves beyond
the classical paradigms of sovereignty, and political struggles have to respond by
staging their own interventions in relation to this new object (History of Sexuality
145).
So the question we want to raise here is a contemporary paraphrase of the
classic question raised by André Bazin: what is cinema in the age of biopower?
How can we conceptualize the relationship between cinema and power at the
precise historical moment when the latter, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
argue, has set its eyes on the complete colonization of “social life in its entirety”
(Empire xv)? Needless to say, these questions are loaded with a number of
ambiguities whose complexities do not necessarily allow for easy answers. Does
cinema have a politics that is inherent to its technological apparatuses? Is it
possible or in any sense useful to attribute a historical function to an artistic
technology that would also determine its political uses? Is cinema merely a tool of
power itself or does it, in fact, carry emancipatory potential?
We might find a few preliminary answers to some of these questions by
mapping the history of cinema onto the history of power as Michel Foucault
outlined it. Upon first glance, it might appear that cinema is, historically speaking,
coeval with what we call, following Foucault, panoptic power. At least, this is the
most common interpretation of cinema’s relation to power: the birth of cinema
introduces to the aesthetic field a new principle of vision and visibility that
corresponds to practices of perpetual surveillance within the social and political

Published by New Prairie Press

1

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

fields.1 Seen from this perspective, then, cinema could be defined as the very
expression of the fundamental principle of a specific type of power. But, given the
fact that the Foucauldian scheme imagines the emergence of biopower as the
intensification of panoptic power, the question emerges: is it now necessary to
define cinema’s political relevance beyond the principle of panopticism? Does the
biopolitics of cinema necessarily move us beyond the logic of surveillance?2
The rudimentary periodization outlined here, however, can be quite
misleading. When we speak of “cinema in the age of biopower,” our language
might suggest that cinema has preceded this age and, having survived its birth in
the age of panopticism, it is now looking for a new purpose under the current
global regime of power. But even a basic historical survey will necessarily
confirm that the emergence of cinema belongs to an age in which biopower has
already superseded panopticism as the dominant mode of power in the West.3
After all, the Foucauldian definition of panoptic power works with examples that
often long predate the actual invention of cinema. Thus, if we follow Foucault’s
historical scheme, we would have to conclude that while cinema was anticipated
by the logic of panoptic power, its actual birth took place under the ascendancy of
biopower in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. According to this logic, then, we
would have to start with the hypothesis that cinema has always already been in
some kind of relation to biopower and has been “biopolitical” from the very start.
We might even go so far as saying that cinema is in fact an artistic form that is
more appropriate for the age of biopower than that of panoptic power.
Thus, if we accept the proposition that cinema is just as much a
biopolitical as a panoptic phenomenon, a common mistake in our treatments of
cinema’s relation to power becomes clearly visible: in the past, we tended to pay
attention only, or at least primarily, to the panoptic possibilities of cinema. As we
know from Foucault, a crucial aspect of panoptic power was the full visibility of
the subject and the invisibility of power. To be more precise, if we follow Jeremy
Bentham’s model, we should say that the basic principle of panopticism is what
we might want to call the visibility of the invisibility of power. After all, the
ominous watchtower in the center of Bentham’s prison is obviously visible even if
we do not know whether or not guards occupy it. Couldn’t we say, then, that
biopower slightly modifies this formula by instead switching our focus to what we
might want to call the invisibility of the visibility of power? In other words, the
moment power becomes fully immanent to life, power is put on visible display in
every gesture and every moment of life. Take, for example, the way we relate to
cell phones. Their phenomenological closeness renders them almost completely
invisible as tools of power in everyday usage. In fact, as extensions of our bodies,
they are mostly experienced as tools of private life. This complete visibility of
power, however, is masked in a way that is different from the logic of the
Panopticon. We do not need the threat of the visibility of the invisibility of power,
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since we have now fully internalized the justifications of this power. We want to
act in accordance with biopower precisely because we accept that it is acting in
our best interest: so even though we understand how smartphones can be used for
surveillance and control purposes, we are not willing to give them up, not least
since we perceive this technology as actually enhancing our capacities to
communicate and, ultimately, live our lives. As a result, we do not see power for
what it is, since it appears to us simply as life.
We can, therefore, paraphrase our opening question in more precise terms:
is cinema in its most general form, which exceeds the classical theatrical
exhibition space, a potential instrument of or a possible antidote to this invisibility
of the full visibility of power?4 The source of the problem here is that in the age
of biopower, every depiction of life is at the same time a representation of power,
but this coincidence of life and power is no longer directly visible. We can see
life, and, on occasion, we can see power at work in this life. But the fact that
power aims at the complete saturation of life is difficult to put on display. In such
an age, by virtue of representing a snippet of life, every film is necessarily also
about power (even if only in a displaced sense). But this fact (that every
representation of life is a representation of power) is not necessarily visible
anymore. Society becomes a Panopticon in which the guards’ tower has been
demolished—not by the violent revolt of the subjects, but by power itself. It is
precisely this moment—when the guards’ tower is no longer necessary—that
marks, in Foucault’s analysis, the moment of transformation when biopower takes
the place of panoptic power as the dominant mode of power (with panoptic power
continuing to exert its effects as a residual mode of power). The inmates have
learned to live in accordance with this power without the threat of the visibility of
the invisibility of power.
This shift of focus from panoptic power to biopower, however, raises an
important question: is it in fact true that the aesthetic force of cinema must be
analyzed exclusively in terms of visibility? Is it true that cinema’s relation to
power must be interpreted exclusively on the level of vision? Can we not argue
that the shift from panopticism to biopower also means that we need to examine
cinema on a much broader affective level precisely because on the “biopolitical
terrain,” as Negri argues, “labor finds its value in affect, if affect is defined as the
‘power to act’ (Spinoza)” (79)? The fact that films become part of life in more
complex forms than just through the visibility of life is hard to question. In other
words, people go (and, arguably, have always gone) to the movies not just for the
visual experience, but also in order to immerse themselves in the haptic, affective,
auditory, and even social dimensions of cinema, which together in their totality
directly inform life outside the movie theater. Could we, then, argue that cinema’s
function is not exhausted in visibility itself: its task, rather, is to tie the domain of
visibility to a whole set of other affective domains. In such a case, the analysis of
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cinema should also necessarily be shifted from an exclusive focus on visibility to
the links cinema establishes between visibility and other fields of human
experience.5
Nostalgia for the Outside
One way of paraphrasing our opening questions would be to inquire if it
were possible to move beyond the logic of the permanent war that, according to
Hardt and Negri, constitutes the essence of global biopower today (Multitude xi).
Is there an outside to the system that has turned war into a “permanent social
relation” (12)? And what is the function of cinema in relation to this outside? We
can understand why many theorists and critics who locate themselves on the left
on the political spectrum remain suspicious of, and often exhibit overt hostility to,
the biopolitical paradigm that has been formulated with the greatest discursive
force by Foucault. Indeed, in the end their rejection of this immanentist paradigm
merely mirrors the embrace of the biopolitical paradigm by those who
nevertheless remain attached to the idea of resistance grounded in an outside
(located either in the here and now of the present or in an elsewhere that awaits us
at the horizon). Both groups remain attached to the idea that an effective politics
against oppressive forces in the present has to be a politics that affirms not only
the possibility but also availability of a position outside those forces. It is,
however, our position that a strong version of what Foucault teaches us—what his
diagnosis of the present reveals—is precisely that a politics grounded in the
assumption of an outside is predicated on a fundamentally erroneous nostalgic
understanding of power. As appealing as it might be—intellectually, emotionally,
aesthetically, or morally—such a conceptualization of politics simply costs us too
much.
One of the most compelling formulations of the topology that we would
like to articulate here can be found in Gilles Deleuze’s monograph on Foucault:
“When power becomes bio-power, resistance becomes the power of life, a vital
power that cannot be confined within species, environment or the paths of a
particular diagram. Is not the force that comes from outside a certain idea of Life,
a certain vitalism, in which Foucault’s thought culminates? Is not life this
capacity to resist force?” (92-93). It is precisely under the conditions of biopower,
Deleuze argues, that the power of resistance is life (comes from it and is of it).
But life’s capacity to resist force is an immanent capacity. In other words, life is
immanent to the very force field within which biopower is constituted as a force
that takes life as its object. As a result, life is this immanent force of resistance
whose relation to force can no longer be understood on the model of a simple
exteriority. Resistance is a force whose exteriority is intensively immanent to the
field of interiority that is life (86). This immanent outside, then, is a
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fundamentally different outside from a dialectically conceived otherness since it is
“farther away than any external world and even any form of exteriority, which
henceforth comes infinitely closer” (86).
Yet, the desire for a position outside of the force field that has been
variously called Empire, neoliberalism, or biopower should, in our view, be taken
seriously as a symptom of the problem at hand, one that is affective in nature.6
The affective force carried by the sheer idea of an outside to capitalism, including
its current iteration (neoliberalism), is considerable and must be heeded. We
might say: it is one of the problems of the present, which Deleuze already
expressed in prescient ways when in the early 1990s he noted the pleasure people
experience in the very act of participating in closing the noose around their necks
ever more tightly (“Postscript”). The pressing political problem, in other words, is
neither that people somehow “want” to be repressed nor that they are tricked by
ideological lure into passive submission to power. Rather, as Daniel W. Smith
argues, the problem is that people invest serious stakes in social systems (such as
neoliberal capitalism)—despite the fact that these systems thwart their interests—
because our desires (drives, affects), far from being owned by us as subjects, are
part of the capitalist infrastructure itself (Smith 74).7
Thus, because it is affective in nature—a matter of desire—we might
further hold that the problem of contemporary biopower is best approached
through the framework of aesthetics. As Jeffrey T. Nealon convincingly argues,
the post-postmodern present of just-in-time neoliberal capitalism is best theorized
as an intensification of the aesthetic paradigm of postmodernism (which as a
cultural logic was, according Fredric Jameson, fully immanent to the economic
regime of late capitalism) (Post-Postmodernism). If Nealon is right, then we can
see why many so insistently hold on to the memory of an outside as if that outside
were (still) real and not something the existence of which might have been in the
process of waning just at the time of what we still remember (often with
nostalgia) as the last great political era (at least in the so-called “First World”):
that of the 1960s (that decade when late modernism gave way to early
postmodernism, if we can go along with Jameson’s famous periodization
scheme). To put it differently, while the desire for the outside appears to be the
abstract form of this longing, its actual content can be clearly identified as the
more or less mythical memory of a concrete historical moment.
We find ourselves in a strange situation today: the memory of the 1960s
continues to exert a strong influence on popular conceptualizations of political
action.8 In fact, the affective force of this memory is so strong that, under its spell,
we continue to believe that a mode of power that has in fact become residual is
still dominant. It is precisely the positively charged affective nature of this
memory that sustains the belief in the persistence of this older form of power. For
if the once dominant regime of power can still be said to be in a hegemonic
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position today, then the dream of the outside (which remains dialectically related
to the system from which it is said to be apart) can be maintained and thus be
allowed to fulfill an apparently fundamental desire that seems so essential that it
might as well be considered natural to human life.
If this brief sketch of our state of affairs—notwithstanding its brevity and
intentionally provocative bend—has some validity, then we have to ask how we
can account for and even combat the reality of the affective force that is attached
to this desire for the outside—for autonomy, authenticity, or whatever name is
given to this outside. This is perhaps the fundamental question governing, in one
way or the other, our present—and it is a question that a number of contemporary
films appear to have engaged in intriguing but also often unacknowledged ways.
As we would like to argue, then, it is precisely here that an analysis of the
biopolitical horizon of contemporary cinema could get underway. In order to
answer our questions about the relationship between cinema and biopower, we
would need to examine the way contemporary cinema defines its relation to this
power and the various affective investments in the mythical outside from which
the critique of this power is imagined to be possible.9
Of course, such an analysis would demand a systematic engagement with
a wide variety of films. For the purposes of this essay, however, we will single out
one (perhaps even a somewhat unusual) example. Hans Weingartner’s Die fetten
Jahre sind vorbei (The Edukators, 2004) is certainly one of these films that
appears to address the issue of biopower in an oblique way. The film has solicited
a number of persuasive critical responses, especially in the field of German
Studies.10 Our goal, here, is not to dispute those arguments, but instead to reframe
what we think this film is doing so obviously that this very obviousness might
have obfuscated the uniqueness of its intervention in the mid-2000s.
Notwithstanding the numerous arguments that examine the film for its politics,
the particularity of its own post-9/11 biopolitical context has oddly remained, at
best, in the margins.11 As a premise, then, we want to proceed by suggesting that
films such as The Edukators render sensible in their own “margins” the political
and aesthetic consequences of the biopolitical paradigm that governs the present.
Of course, when we consider the fact that the director of The Edukators is
well-known for harboring strong allegiances with a leftist political and moral
project invested in the existence of an “outside,” our reading of The Edukators
might seem like a dead end from the very start.12 Nevertheless, we insist on
pursuing this counterfactual interpretation, since we think that it will afford us the
opportunity to shed some light on the question this special issue poses about the
role that aesthetics and art—including cinema—might play in relation to the 24/7
regime: whether or not it is (still) possible to find “new ways of beating the
timeless time of neoliberalism” (as the prompt for this special issue on 24/7
formulates the question). We turn in this essay to The Edukators not only because
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we think that it answers the question in the negative, but also because it seems to
suggest that the question itself might already be shaped by a nostalgia for an
outside in that it heavily invests in the notion of the “new.”13
As many contemporary films with a biopolitical focus, The Edukators
turns to the question of terrorism at the very moment when the so-called “war on
terror” had become the organizing principle of the permanent state of exception
that we live in—to wit, an allegedly temporary affair that is, nevertheless, in
effect 24/7 and has achieved temporal transcendence precisely by assuming the
fullness of time.14 What strikes us about the film is that it conceptualizes terrorism
in an unusual way.15 First and foremost, it forces us to reflect on the paradoxical
nature of a terrorist act that lacks any public representation. As a result, the film
identifies the political force of this kind of terrorism not with brute power or
physical violence but, rather, with an affective force. Differently put, the film
suggests that this kind of political action does not belong to the disciplinary or
panoptic regime of power, but to that of control societies or, in Foucault’s sense,
to the regime of biopower. Indeed, we might go so far as to say that the film
imagines a viral politics as an immanent mode of response to the regime of
biopower. We can evoke here the model of a virus precisely in the sense that these
political actions “jump” from one subject (or group of subjects) to another without
conscious or intentional communication between those subjects: their actions, the
film suggests, exert a degree of effectivity, or force, that allows them to be
imitated elsewhere, in a different place and by different people who are not
connected to the original Edukators (since no traditional communication, via
representation, takes place).16 Such a politics, contrary to what most might think
about the film and its director, is not predicated on either the need or hope for an
outside (that would remain nothing but the dialectical other to the inside of the
system). Instead, we view The Edukators as an attempt to imagine in dramatic
form something that is still in need of more consistent theorization: an affirmation
of a politics of a radical outside that paradoxically remains purely immanent.17
The Viral Politics of The Edukators
The central question posed by The Edukators—whether in the age of
neoliberal capitalism it is still possible to engage in meaningful political action—
is formulated early on by Jule (Julia Jentsch), the film’s Catherine to Jan’s (Daniel
Brühl) and Peter’s (Stipe Erceg) Jules and Jim.18 Jule is disillusioned by the
ineffectiveness of the classical political activism in which she engages, such as
protesting the sale of sneakers produced under exploitative conditions in
Southeast Asian sweatshops. She is furthermore dejected by her dire financial
situation resulting from a car accident she caused while driving without insurance.
In other words, both her public actions and private concerns are responses to

Published by New Prairie Press

7

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

corporate forces that show no interest in the effects they have on individual fates.
This, of course, hardly qualifies as news. But what is remarkable about The
Edukators is that it takes seriously the consequences of this reflection on this state
of affairs.
Unlike the viewers, who have already seen her boyfriend, Peter, and Jan
break into mansions in Berlin’s wealthy neighborhoods only to rearrange furniture
without appropriating anything for their own purposes, Jule is still ignorant of the
true nature of their occasional night excursions when she is sitting with Jan on the
rooftop of her apartment building from which she is about to be evicted.
Reflecting on her own dismal state of affairs, Jule remarks to Jan: “that’s why
there aren’t any more youth movements. Everyone has the feeling it’s all been
done before. Others tried and failed. Why should it work for us?”

At this moment, the scene is staged so that it invites us to generalize Jule’s
predicament as the state of affairs governing the present. It does this both by using
cinematic shot compositions that give us a sense of intimacy with the protagonists
(as if we were with them—both spatially and emotionally—at this moment) and
by reinforcing the fact that the film has already successfully presented Jule as the
primary locus for spectatorial identification. Having fallen victim to what the film
affirms as a systemic case of injustice endemic to the neoliberal capitalist system,
Jule is a smart young woman who is played by an actress skilled enough to
convincingly infuse her character with the sincere convictions of someone who
yearns to be an idealist but who has been disappointed by her “traditional”
political actions one too many times. Jan’s response—that the best ideas of all
revolutions survive and that, similarly, what is good in private revolts survives
and strengthens the individual—foreshadows the plot development. Jule soon
joins Jan on an “edukating” excursion while Peter is on vacation in Spain—an
excursion that, in turn, goes awry when she later discovers that she left her cell
phone at the house of the man whose car she had wrecked.19 Searching for her
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phone, they are surprised by Hardenberg’s return, which ultimately leads all three
to kidnap him to a hut in the Austrian alps, the setting for the film’s long middle
part.
What is noteworthy about Jan’s response to Jule, however, is that he does
not contest the fundamental insight of her analysis: that the conditions of
possibility for rebellious youth movements—and by implication any mass
movement—are no longer available because the political actions associated with
mass movements have all been tried.20 And this is where a biopolitical reading of
the film can get underway. As Roger Cook astutely argues, the political actions in
which the Edukators engage are based on a rejection of “more traditional forms of
radical opposition in favor of a biopolitical solution that can yield self-liberation
from this pervasive regime of control” (320). Put differently, the protagonists’
actions are not driven by a nostalgia for the 1960s—often thought of as the last
“golden” age of student and workers protest and mass movements—
notwithstanding the fact that many commentators seek to situate their actions in
the context of Situationist détournement praxis (Palfreyman), the Spaßguerilla
concept of West-Berlin’s Commune I in the late ‘60s (Homewood), or
postmodern pop politics (McCarthy). Without wanting to contest any of these
astute readings, we nevertheless want to take the discussion of the film in a
slightly different direction by foregrounding two aspects that have essentially
gone unnoticed (or in any case have not been deemed worth discussing): first, we
will insist on the fact that for the Edukators the target of political action is no
longer what it used to be for the activists during the period of the “long ’68” with
its violent legacy; and, second, we will try to draw the consequences of the fact
that, according to the film’s plot, this new kind of terrorist action remains without
any public representation.21
Underlying both of these points is the dissolution of the public-private
binary or, in the terms of this special issue, the idea that there is private time and
public time, with the former being the very time that remains outside of, and
therefore has to be defended against, capitalism’s relentless efforts to valorize
human activity. The film, in other words, takes seriously Jonathan Crary’s
argument that “capitalism cannot limit itself” (128). But unlike Crary, who posits
“the restorative inertness of sleep” as an antidote to the “deathliness of all the
accumulation, financialization, and waste that have devastated anything once held
in common” (128)—he argues that “sleep can stand for the durability of the
social, and that sleep might be analogous to other thresholds at which society
could defend or protect itself” (25)—The Edukators does not posit sleep as the
last remainder of an outside. Contrary to the “nostalgic longing, not for a calm,
beautiful, and orderly life but for a time when political activism and movement
still seemed to ‘make sense’” that Maria Stehle attributes to Weingartner (415),
the film’s protagonists show no nostalgia for this (lost) outside. Instead, as Cook
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posits, they proceed from the premise, seemingly in agreement with Hardt and
Negri, that “‘the first question of political [action] today’” is “‘not if or even why
there will be resistance and rebellion, but rather how to determine the enemy
against which to rebel’” (317). Whereas in the ‘70s, the RAF explicitly sought to
target public figures such as captains of industry and politicians, the film’s
activists target wealthy people regardless of their public—that is: representative—
function. We do not gain the impression, for example, that prior to Jan and Jule’s
breaking into Hagenberg’s home Peter and Jan even knew about their victims’
jobs. And even though Jule persuades Jan to break into Hagenberg’s home, her
motive for doing so is private revenge rather than any public, representative
function he may serve. When Jan wants them to leave the house, she requests that
they do something more substantial than merely rearranging some furniture and
decor because, as she puts it, “ich muss ein paar Agressionen abbauen” ‘I need to
work off some aggression.’
Indeed, up until his unintended encounter with Hagenberg, Jan (together
with Peter) has always managed to leave the homes they “edukated” before their
owners’ return (and without destroying anything but breaking a window). While
they left traces of their former presence—rearranged objects and notes stating,
“You have too much money” or “The years of plenty are over,” signed “Die
Erziehungsberechtigten” (The Edukators, or, more literally: those who have the
right to educate)—those traces were not meant for public consumption. Indeed,
even when a small paragraph reporting on their activities appears in the back
pages of a Berlin newspaper, Peter and Jan, though pleased, neither celebrate nor
even linger on the fact that their actions have acquired a small measure of media
attention. Instead of dwelling on the representational effect of their actions, Peter
is more interested in showing Jan the negligee he bought for Jule, not yet knowing
that his girlfriend has fallen in love with his best friend. Indeed, at no time does
the film suggest that the Edukators desire public notoriety: unlike their terrorist
predecessors, the Edukators neither seek to communicate with the public via
video recordings nor attempt to persuade a readership through publishing
manifestos or declarations in which they would justify their actions, as the RAF’s
Ulrike Meinhof famously did. Note, too, that their actions are not “spectacular” in
the sense that, for example, the attacks on the World Trade Center on September
11, 2001 were. Whereas the Edukators’ actions certainly evoke an activist
tradition that includes the Commune I and the Situationists, the Edukators
nevertheless limit their actions to private spaces that are invisible to the public.
Just as they do not seek self-representation by communicating through
newspapers, television, or the internet, they also do not seek with their home
invasions to create what one might call a “representative” act—one whose targets
exceed those who are most immediately affected, as was the case with the 9/11
attacks. In short, their actions remain essentially invisible to the public: their
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terrorism works without this kind of representation, and for this reason it neither
is predicated on symbolic meaning nor does it aspire to create such meaning.
To put this differently, the traces left behind by the Edukators are not
representational traces, or, better, the primary function of these traces is not
public symbolism. Instead, as Jan explicitly claims in a statement that has largely
been ignored by commentators, the goal is to ensure that their wealthy victims
“sich nicht so sicher fühlen in ihren privaten Hochsicherheitszonen. Das ist doch
das gruseligste Gefühl: du kommst nach Hause und jemand war da und hat dich
beobachtet, und wird dich auch weiterhin beobachten” ‘don’t feel so safe in their
private high security zones. It’s the most horrifying feeling: you come home and
notice someone was there and observed you—and will continue to observe you.’

Instead of taking goods and passing them on to the needy, as Jan continues to
explain, they do not steal anything because their victims are used to robbers: “Ne,
die sollen richtig Schiss kriegen. Wenn die nämlich am Bankschalter stehen,
flüster ‘ne leise Stimme: ‘Sie haben zu viel Geld. Sie haben zu viel Geld.’ Und in
dem Moment sind sie ganz alleine. Und dann kann ihnen keiner mehr helfen:
weder das Geld, noch die Frau, noch die scheiss Bullen” ‘No, they need to be
really afraid. For when they are at an ATM machine a quiet voice whispers: ‘You
have too much money’. And at this moment they are all alone. And then no one
can help them—not their money, their wife, or the shitty cops.’ (When Jan
discovers that on one occasion, contrary to their agreement, Peter actually did take
an expensive watch, he gets upset at his friend and throws the watch out the
window as they are driving in their old VW bus through Berlin.)
Notwithstanding the film’s appropriation of cinematic strategies typical of
Hollywood films (Cook 324) or its possibly troubling gender politics (see note
19), what makes the film interesting is that by taking seriously how neoliberal
power works, it ends up revealing that the classic (public) targets of terrorism (the
state, the police, or public figures) are no longer appropriate targets for politics in
the age of biopower.22 Instead, the Edukators’ terrorist acts withdraw from public
symbolism to a physical or visceral attack on the everyday life of their targets.
The ultimate goal of these acts is to produce a double critique of the dialectical
co-dependence of contemporary capitalism and the violent and suicidal form of
terrorism that is conceived of as its other. In effect, the Edukators’ actions aim to
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deconstruct this opposition by formulating the coordinates of a biopolitical form
of resistance to both extremes. We might even say that what the film (unwittingly,
perhaps) begins to conceptualize for us is a new form of terrorism: a properly
biopolitical form of terrorism that we propose, with due caution, to call “bioterrorism.”23
However, our coinage should not be mistaken for the kind of terrorism
based on bio-chemical warfare. Indeed, as we just noted, the properly biopolitical
“bio-terrorism” at work in The Edukators is opposed to the other kind of bioterrorism, for whereas the latter seeks to de-capacitate and even destroy life, the
former is not about destroying life. Unlike the terrorism that takes the life of the
enemy, this kind of political action aims to infiltrate the life of its targets. The
point of bio-terrorist actions, then, is not to physically harm or even kill their
targets in order to assert the power to take life. Rather, this bio-terror contests
neoliberalism on its own grounds by responding in kind: it challenges power to
assert its power to make life. The goal of bio-terrorism is to make its targets live a
particular life by intervening in their lives on a micro-level; in so doing, it
performs what we might want to call a micro-bio-politics. In other words, the goal
of bio-terrorism is to produce a new kind of life, thus contesting the very
operational principle of the age of biopower on its own terms, which Foucault has
famously defined as “a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death”
(History of Sexuality, 138). And this power to foster life operates, as imagined by
The Edukators, very much akin to a virus.24 It affects the subjects that have been
exposed to it on the level of life itself: paradoxically for a film whose English title
foregrounds education and a group who call themselves, in the original German,
die Erziehungsberechtigten (which refers to people who have been granted an
institutional or formal right to educate but who are not necessarily the parents of
those whom they have the right to educate), they actually do not aim to educate
their targets—not, at least, if we think of educating in the more traditional leftist
sense of consciousness raising. Once the wealthy victims’ home has been revealed
as susceptible to invasion by “the force of the outside,” their owners will no
longer be able to shake the resulting sensation—of violation, of danger, of the
unknown, of the invisible that may always already be with(in) them.
This, then, also explains why we purposefully retain the term “terrorism.”
In an age when every resistance to capitalism is potentially coded as a form of
terrorism, it might appear that the politically useful task would be to not rely on
this category to describe the actions of these young people. But it is impossible to
deny that the Edukators’ goal is to instill fear in a specific segment of society: the
message of the movie appears to be that the rich should be scared of the masses.
The ultimate insult today is that the rich are not even afraid of the people whose
lives produce their wealth. The problem is that characters like Hagenberg are too
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comfortably entrenched in their fortresses of power and live their lives in absolute
indifference toward the lives of the majority.
Arguably, however, the film’s intriguing insights about politics in the age
of biopower might have gone unnoticed (or been reduced to a discussion of the
legacy of the ‘60s) because of its relatively traditional cinematic form, which, as
Homewood points out, “might be said to speak to the ‘pop’ sensibility of a
consumerist youth-driven society” (342). Unlike for the film’s critics, however,
this is not a problem for Homewood, who argues that the film offers “‘pop’-based
protest with content” and defends this strategy because “the productive dialogue
which the director sets up with the beleaguered memory of ‘1968’ ultimately
challenges a prevailing trend towards its commodification by restoring its
significance as a politically symbolic episode” (342). From his perspective, the
politics of the Edukators and the film are rooted in an affirmation of the slogan
widely associated with ’68: “all power to the imagination.” Indeed, the film’s
critique of media—especially TV—provides substantial fodder for such a reading,
which is why it would be wrong to suggest its incorrectness.25 Still, we might say
that the problem with defending the film’s aesthetic by suggesting that it
ultimately seeks to keep alive or re-actualize the ‘60s demand to give “all power
to the imagination” might very well be that such a program would merely consist
of seeking new art forms and a new aesthetic that might be able to elude
appropriation by capitalism. The Edukators’ own actions, however, are not about
creating new forms of art, nor, it must be said, are they about not doing so.
Rather, they remain indifferent to the demand for novelty and as such could be
seen as in fact rejecting the (aesthetic) ideology of the new—perhaps exactly
because of the insight that today the new and its glorification fuel the engine of
the very system that such a politics of the new seeks to combat. Cook, who is the
only one to discuss the film alongside its biopolitical context, hints at this problem
in his reading of the film when arguing that the “biopolitical philosophy put into
practice by the Edukators extends to all aspects of life, including film aesthetics.
Weingartner applies it when he appropriates the cinematic strategies of
Hollywood and turns them back against the capitalist system that invented them”
(324). Instead of aggressively attacking his audience’s viewing habits, that is, the
director “embraces aesthetic elements that Leftist filmmakers in the past have
generally rejected as manipulative tactics of commercial production unsuitable for
their political purposes. [He] chooses, rather, the heightened realist style of
representational narrative film that has become the lingua franca of global
cinema” (324).
It is precisely this representational realism that seems at odds with the
film’s diegetic (and implicitly also extra-diegetic) radical politics. For the
assumption is that such a mainstream form is unable to live up to the politics that
is encapsulated by the film’s English title: to educate. Indeed, is it not the case
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that the very title suggests that the function of art might be pedagogical in nature,
that art is political action with a pedagogical goal? Perhaps what needs to be
attended to with regard to the film is that the concept of education it offers is not
really commensurate with the classic paradigm of “consciousness raising” in
which the paradigm of representational realism traditionally trades.
The Politics of the Radical Inside (A Speculative Conclusion)
So what kind of an education takes place in The Edukators? We might be
able to use this question to formulate a highly speculative conclusion that goes
beyond common interpretations of the film. Our discussion so far has suggested
that the critical consensus concerning the film pits the form of the film against its
political content. As long as we think in traditional terms about the film’s
educational dimensions, this contradiction indeed cannot be reconciled. But our
reading has tried to show that it is not entirely correct to assume that on the level
of its form the film is simply an unqualified affirmation of the currently
hegemonic form of cinematic realism. In order to be able to make sense of this
alleged contradiction, we might first have to take seriously what the movie
teaches us on the level of its content. On this level, as an initial step, we could
argue that the film gestures towards an a-representational politics of affect
through its dramatization of a terrorist act without public representations. We
should, of course, heed the contradictions of this proposition: on the one hand, the
film argues on the level of representation (on the level of its plot) for an arepresentational politics; on the other hand, it stages a terrorist act without public
representation in the form of cinema (a form of public representation).
These contradictions, however, are not as detrimental to the educational
mission of the film as some would like to believe. For if we start with these
contradictions on the level of the content, we might have to ask whether the
choice of form for the film was not already determined by these speculations.
That is, the real question is not whether realism in general is an appropriate form
of political radicalism in the age of contemporary capitalism; rather, we need to
ask whether the choice of form for this specific film can be made consistent with
the politics put forth on the level of its content (namely, the argument in favor of
an a-representational political act). Seen from this angle, then, our concern is not
to pass judgment on realism in toto but to examine if there are possible tactical
uses of realism today.
On the level of its content, then, the film provides us with two basic
paradigms of political action. Relying on a set of old categories, we could call
these the paradigms of redistribution and re-education. The first applies to the
fact that the Edukators break into houses and leave without directly engaging in
the classic political program of the re-appropriation of wealth. They enter the
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homes of the class enemy, but only to reorganize objects. They are, no doubt,
criminals, but they are not robbers. This is where the classic meaning of
redistribution breaks down: while the Edukators are certainly interested in the
redistribution of wealth, what they actually redistribute is merely the spatial
organization of the enemy’s dwelling. All they do is leave behind traces of their
very existence. By doing so, they affect the space and those inhabiting it with a
(signaletic) force.26 The meaning of this force—what it signifies or
communicates—is less important for the effectiveness of their actions than what
they in fact do, namely, they begin to govern their targets’ mode of being in the
world from the very moment of the discovery of these traces.
If we were to take this politics of reorganization seriously, we could read
this part of the plot as an allegory of a specific kind of political action. What is the
essence of this reorganization? On this allegorical level, the film suggests that
political action must take place within the enemy’s house: the act of resistance
itself is internal to the system that it opposes. The Edukators do not appeal to a
radical outside but to a radical inside.27 We might even conclude that, rather than
stepping outside the system that they criticize, they suggest that we need to go
further inside beyond the superficial interiority that is understood under the name
“privacy” today. Taking this logic a step further, we could say that the film
proposes an immanentist politics of the radical inside that identifies the nature of
political action as the reorganization of already available resources (against the
politics of the radical outside that defines political action exclusively as the
invention of the absolutely new). As Deleuze once argued, “any society is defined
not so much by its contradictions [inside/outside] as by its [immanent] lines of
flight” (“Control and Becoming” 171)—virtual lines that can be actualized by
rearranging, or redistributing, the very real forces that in any given distribution
block them.
It is this reading of the politics of redistribution (as the redistribution of
the sensible) that might allow us to give a different interpretation of the surprise
ending of the film. The film’s narrative logic initially leads us to believe that the
protagonists will be caught by a highly militarized police force; but just as we
ready ourselves for their (genre-typical) final showdown with the police, the film
reveals that they are already elsewhere, outside Germany, on route to a new
educating mission involving an attack on communication satellites in the
Mediterranean. As all surprise endings, this one is also predicated upon the
assumption that some information was withheld from someone (the audience or
specific characters) along the way. As the plot was unfolding before our eyes, we
lost sight of the simple fact that we are being manipulated and are given only
strategically structured information that will not allow us to correctly guess the
film’s ending. Arguably, in this particular case, the ending forces us to reconsider
the long middle section of the plot that assumes the form of a drawn-out
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ideological discussion between the Edukators and their kidnapped class enemy.
For what the ending suggests is that somewhere along the way some crucial
information was withheld from us, and we cannot exactly identify the point in the
plot from which this ending can be deduced logically. In other words, somebody
was not telling the truth.
A close analysis of the film’s last minutes, following the moment when
the Edukators return to Berlin and release Hagenberg at his house, would reveal
significant logical inconsistencies that severely undermine the film’s overall
representational realist aesthetics, including its insinuations of verisimilitude and
logical consistency. For example, the film’s editing links images of Hagenberg
seemingly struggling to decide whether or not to call the police on his erstwhile
captors, of the Edukators asleep together in a bed in a (momentarily) unspecified
location, of a militarized police force storming an apartment while Hagenberg
awaits the result of their action in a police car, of Jule waking up in response to a
knock on the door, and of the police finding the apartment evacuated.

But the temporal logic of this series of events does not add up at all. It appears
that two different temporal dimensions of the story are being edited into one
single sequence: one that narrates Hagenberg’s decision to call the police and the
subsequent raid on the apartment and the other that represents the Edukators’
escape from Germany. In spite of what the editing suggests, these two series
could not have been simultaneously unfolding parallel events.
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Moreover, the apartment the police—and we—find emptied is not one we
have seen in this manner before. It is certainly reasonable to assume that it is
Jule’s apartment. For one, Hagenberg has access to her address due to the car
accident in which both were involved and that caused Jule to be seriously
indebted. (Furthermore, if we pay close attention, we notice the same ceramic
tiles that we already might have noticed earlier when Jan spent time with Jule in
her apartment). However, when we last saw the apartment—before they abducted
Hagenberg to the Alps—we witnessed how Jan and Jule vandalized it in an act of
youthful exuberance, splashing paint at her apartment’s walls instead of repainting it in an orderly fashion as Jule’s landlord, who evicted her, required of
her. Indeed, this entire scene ends with an image that we surely remember:
namely of the slogan, “Jedes Herz ist eine revolutionäre Zelle” ‘Each heart is a
revolutionary cell,’ written in red paint on the vandalized wall, “signed” with their
handprints.
Logically, it makes no sense to assume that the Edukators would have
returned to Jule’s apartment to clean it up, given that they must have at least
considered the possibility that Hagenberg would call the police; and if the
apartment had already been cleaned of any traces of their vandalism before their
return to Berlin, then we would have to ask: when, by whom, and why? We are
thus inclined to offer the following proposition (regardless of the filmmaker’s
intentions): while not relying on Brechtian or modernist alienation effects, the
film confronts its viewers with the provocation that the cinematic form it appeared
to mobilize precisely in order to play out realistically the ideological debates
during the film’s long middle section has never been realist at all; or rather: it
simultaneously was and was not a realist lens that granted us access to the goingson.
It is precisely this immanentist rearrangement of its realist form that in
turn also provokes us to consider the possibility that the film’s content has been
rearranged with regard to its most crucial message. Could it not be the case, that
is, that the message “Manche Menschen ändern sich nie” ‘some people never
change,’ as the handwritten sign the police find hanging on a wall in the otherwise
empty apartment states, might in fact not be addressed to Hagenberg, as viewers
likely assume, but to us? Or, might it not at least be addressed to those of us who
actually harbored hope that Hagenberg would in fact live up to his promise not to
rat on the Edukators and, in so doing, evidence that he has truly changed: that his
old ideals from his socialist student days have not died and that they have been reawoken from their long slumber during his days as a captain of industry as a
result of the sheer persuasive force of the ideology critique to which his young
interlocutors exposed him in the mountain hut?
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In other words, what we are saying is that such an affective investment on the part
of the viewers is at this moment rendered sensible by the film as the very
symptom that, like a virus, has infected the left-liberal viewer who believes
consciousness raising is capable of undoing the systemic damage the affective
force of neoliberalism has done to its subjects, including the damage it has done
to those who are among its “victors” (the one percenters, to use a term that
emerged only some years after the film’s release).
It is here then that the second political paradigm depicted in the film, that
of classic political re-education, has to be put in relation with the paradigm of
redistribution. The possibility of a counterfactual reading emerges here. The
politics of re-education must be preceded by a primary act of redistribution. On a
theoretical level, this claim means that before the production of a specific kind of
knowledge can get underway, an act of redistribution (in the form of
reorganization) needs to set the stage for this education. Put differently, a primary
act of aestheticization (in the sense of first establishing the very coordinates of
sensible action) must precede effective political action. First the redistribution of
the sensible must define the parameters of what is visible and invisible, sayable
and non-sayable, before the political act of (re-)education can be effectively put in
place.
The truly provocative conclusion that we might reach based on this insight
about the film is that the long middle section that is set up as a classic sequence of
political re-education was not what it appeared to be. In spite of appearances,
what was at stake in this part of the film was not at all classic consciousness
raising. Rather, we could see this section as an elaborate ruse put on by the
Edukators who anticipated that Hagenberg (a veteran of the ‘60s who boasts of
his friendship with Rudi Dutschke) would still only be capable of politics in these
outdated terms. Thus, according to this speculative reading, what took place in the
Alps was actually political theater rather than classic propaganda: the Edukators
pretended to go along with the script that they themselves created because they
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knew that this kind of old-fashioned education would, in fact, fail. The ending of
the film seems to suggest that the Edukators knew in advance that Hagenberg
would turn them over to the police. The real education, therefore, that takes place
here is the proof that the old kind of education necessarily fails. Hagenberg is
once again left with the knowledge that his world is not as secure as he had
believed.
It is this take on education that might allow us to reconcile the apparent
contradiction between the film’s form and content. For if we take seriously the coexistence of the two political paradigms, the contradiction ceases to exist. The
film’s realist form follows the logic of the redistribution put forth by the film: it is
a way for cinema to enter the house of the enemy and reorganize the furniture that
it already finds there. It is part of the immanentist politics of the radical inside:
rather than criticize realism from the outside, it shows us a way of undermining it
from the inside. What appears on the screen for us only appears to be realism. In
reality, it is a staged realism that maintains a certain distance from the realist form
itself. This minimal distance is precisely the location of the displacement that
allows for a resistance that does not imagine this possibility only from outside.
Might we say, then, that this minimal distance constitutes an example of those
“vacuoles of noncommunication” Deleuze had in mind when he tried to envision
strategies for resistance in the age of control (“Control and Becoming” 175)?
Might the film be seen as aesthetically “hijacking” realism, creating an aesthetic
“circuit breaker,” a storage bubble within realism that redistributes what is and is
not (im)possible as a means to elude control?28

Notes
1. For a classic discussion of the historical change in vision that takes place in the
nineteenth century, see Jonathan Crary’s Techniques of the Observer: On Vision
and Modernity in the 19th Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990). In addition,
see Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception, trans. Patrick
Camiller (New York: Verso, 1989).
2. In Foucault Beyond Foucault, Jeffrey T. Nealon argues that “the shifts of
Foucauldian emphasis are more productively understood as a series of
‘intensifications’” and that by “tracing this logic of intensification in Foucault’s
work” we can discover “ways we might respond to the mutations and
intensifications of power that we’ve seen since Foucault’s death in 1984” (5).
3. Here we follow Nealon’s “Williamsian” reading of Foucault’s genealogy of
power: “Although these modes exist alongside each other in the late eighteenth
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century and beyond, one might say (importing some diagnostic terminology from
Raymond Williams) that at any historical juncture, certain modes and practices of
power are emergent, others dominant, still others residual” (Foucault Beyond
Foucault 28-29).
4. We recognize that the category of the cinema is in flux in an age when moving
images and their production, exhibition, and circulation are undergoing significant
changes. However, for the purposes of this essay we limit our analysis to a filmic
example that belongs to this classic tradition of moving images. In our larger
research project, of which this essay is simply a first step, we plan to examine the
relationship between cinema in its traditional form and representations of
terrorism in what we claim is and always has been a quintessential biopolitical
medium.
5. Of course, we acknowledge that not all engagement with cinema has given
primacy to the image. On the role of sound in cinema, see for instance Michel
Chion, Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen, trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York:
Columbia UP, 1994); on cinema’s haptic aspects, see Laura U. Marks, The Skin of
the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses (Durham: Duke UP,
2000). Notwithstanding such work, it strikes us as inarguable that most of the
time when we think of cinema, we frame our discussions through the logic of
(in)visibility.
6. Such desire clearly manifests itself not only in many of the more popular and
powerful social causes, including those pursued by the ecological and
environmental movements, but also in the popularity among the liberal
bourgeoisie of the farm-to-table phenomenon.
7. Or as Deleuze writes with some bewilderment, today “Many young people
have a strange craving to be ‘motivated’, they’re always asking for special
courses and continuing education” (“Postscript” 182) and thus exhibit a desire
(“craving”) that, in Deleuze’s view, fuels control societies that run on the
imperative that “you never finish anything” in contradistinction to disciplinary
societies, which would force its subjects to always start all over again (179).
Some twenty years further into the reign of neoliberalism, Lauren Berlant’s
analysis of what she calls a “relation of cruel optimism,” which, she argues,
“exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing”
(Cruel Optimism 1), echoes Deleuze’s diagnosis. Berlant argues that the question
of “how to talk about [exploited subjects’] need to maintain binding to the normal
in the context of crisis is a theoretical and political problem of more than
consciousness” (170-71). She therefore seeks to “understand collective
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attachments to fundamentally stressful conventional lives” and asks “how it is that
forms associated with ordinary violence remain desirable.” Berlant suggests that
this might be precisely because “of a kind of narcotic/utopian pleasure” that these
forms, due to “their very familiarity” (167-68), offer subjects who are in fact
violated and exploited by the very normative forces to which they seek to remain
bound.
8. The persistence of this memory can be articulated in politically opposing ways:
the right-wing insistence of the failure of the project of ’68 is simply the inverse
of the leftist nostalgia for the mass movements of the 60s. Both, in effect, are
ways of memorializing the 60s.
9. One film that strikes us as rich in possibilities for such an investigation is
Michael Haneke’s Caché (Hidden, 2005), but our analysis of this film will have to
be done elsewhere.
10. In addition to the texts we refer to below, see also Paul Cooke and Rob Stone,
“Transatlantic Drift: Slackers, Flâneurs, Idiots and Edukators,” Lucia Nagib and
Anne Jerslev, eds., Impure Cinema: Intermedial and Intercultural Approaches to
Film (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014): 82-101; Rachel Palfreyman, “Links and
Chains: Trauma Between the Generations in the Heimat Mode,” Paul Cooke and
Marc Silberman, eds., Screening War: Perspectives on German Suffering
(Rochester: Camden House): 145-164; and Nicole Thesz, “From
Jugendbewegung to RAF: Youth, Friendship, and Protest in Post-Wall German
Cinema,” Studies in 20th and 21st Century Literature 34.1 (winter 2010): 23-46.
11. The one exception is Roger Cook’s essay, which we reference below;
ultimately, however, Cook takes his analysis in a somewhat different direction
than we do.
12. It is well known that for a while, Weingartner lived “off the grid,” as it were,
as a squatter in post-unified Berlin in the mid-1990s.
13. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of nostalgia as a non-normative
political concept, see Roland Végső, “Stalin’s Boots and the March of History
(Post-Communist Memories),” Cultural Critique 83 (Winter 2013): 31-62.
14. For the permanent state of exception, see Giorgio Agamben’s book State of
Exception. Some films that can be said to have a biopolitical focus and turn to the
problem of terrorism to dramatize it include Haneke’s Caché, Christian Petzold’s
Die innere Sicherheit (The State I Am In, 2000), Hany Abu-Assad’d Paradise
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Now (2005), Kelly Reichardt’s Knight Moves (2013), and Zal Batmanglij’s The
East (2013).
15. The film explicitly frames the anarchic activities of its protagonists in the
context of “terrorism”—specifically that of the Red Army Faction (RAF). This
question is explicitly dramatized at the beginning of the long middle section of the
film set in the Austrian mountains, when the Edukators debate with their “victim”
whether or not their actions differ from those of their famous—and more
visible—predecessors, the RAF. Roger Cook and Chris Homewood also discuss
the Edukators’ actions in the context of the (West-) German lineage of internal
(left-wing) terrorism, arguing, respectively, that “The Edukators brings the history
of terrorism in the Federal Republic into play” (Cook 313) and that it is necessary
to “examine the encounter of the ‘Edukators’ with the memory of urban terrorism
in Germany” (Homewood 336); and Jaimey Fischer sees the film as part of a
“remarkable wave of German films about domestic terrorism and radical politics”
ushered in by Petzold’s The State I Am In (38) at the start of the millennium.
16. Indeed, in a deleted scene (available on the US DVD of the film), we see the
three protagonists respond with amazement to a Bild-Zeitung report that informs
readers of six attacks by “The Edukators” in various cities that apparently took
place during the very night when our protagonists left Germany for the
Mediterranean. Jule comments: “Woher haben die das? Woher haben die die
Information?” ‘Where did they get this from? From where did they get the
information?’, meaning: how is it possible for others to imitate our protagonists’
actions given that they themselves did not engage in the traditional
representational politics of groups such as the RAF (the Edukators did not
produce any pamphlets, communiqués, videos, etc.) The fact that Weingartner
chose to cut this particular scene from the finished film lends support to our
arguments that a) the Edukators’ “terrorist” activities are not predicated on a
representational logic and b) their political actions work like a virus, jumping
from host to host, infecting and thus affecting them in such a way that the new
hosts are provoked into action, into engaging in a mimetic action that is
nevertheless a-representational and instead responds across time and space
without first having been exposed to a representation of a prior action.
17. One could conceptualize this politics along the lines of what Deleuze once
called “transcendental empiricism,” which rather than aiming at formulating the
conditions of action through the lens of re-presentation, seeks to find and foster
the conditions of creative production by redistributing the terms of the situation in
an immanentist fashion. As Daniel Smith and John Protevi gloss Deleuze’s
paradoxical notion, “the aim of philosophy,” for Deleuze, “is not to rediscover the
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eternal or the universal, but to find the singular conditions under which something
new is produced. In other words—and this is a pragmatic perspective from which
Deleuze never deviated—philosophy aims not at stating the conditions of
knowledge qua representation, but at finding and fostering the conditions of
creative production” (“Gilles Deleuze”).
18. One of the film’s many intertexts is François Truffaut’s Jules et Jim (1962), as
Margret McCarthy (522) points out.
19. That it is the female protagonist’s desire for revenge that undermines the “cold
rationality” of Jan and Peter’s actions, and that it is her mistake that forces Jan to
return with her to the scene of their crime, can of course be seen as a sign of the
film’s problematic gender politics. However, Rachel Palfreyman’s analysis of the
role Jule plays complicates such an overly reductive reading of the film’s gender
politics. In her view the film positions Jule precisely to undo Jan’s and Peter’s
conventional, indeed bourgeois, (sexual) morality.
20. Here, we might have to recall the fact that the film’s release precedes the
Encampments and Occupy movements emerging a few years later in response to
the global financial crisis; but at least in the context of the (still) wealthy countries
such as Germany and the US, these movements can hardly be said to have
succeeded, and have in fact not survived their most immediate context.
21. Scholars have persuasively argued that ’68 needs to be thought of in terms
that exceed 1968. See especially Daniel J. Sherman and Ruud van Dijk, ed., The
Long 1968: Revisions and New Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2013).
22. Was this, in the end, not the RAF’s most fundamental mistake: to believe that
targeting state representatives would still matter at the very moment when—
behind their backs, as it were—the regime of power underwent a transformation
in kind from disciplinarity to control? The RAF missed power’s “head-fake” in
the early 1970s, but the effects of its fatal oversight have been so compelling that
the then-emerging and subsequently new dominant regime of neoliberal biopower
has been able to return time and again to the specter of the RAF whenever it
proved opportune for its own purposes: the neoliberal society of control has
nothing to fear from either the RAF or its regular discursive returns precisely
because the “enemy of the state” serves, as such, a productive disciplinary
function that works quite well for purposes of control rather than against it. Marco
Abel makes this point as well in his discussion of Petzold’s The State I Am In
(80).

Published by New Prairie Press

23

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

23. While it is true that the Edukators’ actions have a symbolic quality insofar as
they rearrange objects of considerable financial value in the homes of the rich, it
must be kept in mind that diegetically they nevertheless do not “represent”
themselves to anyone but their immediate targets. Thus, their actions affect their
victims regardless of what we, as the audience, might also perceive as symbolic
action. Indeed, while they do rearrange financially valuable objects, they also put
photographs in the fridge or move mundane toys to unusual locations, thus
indicating that their “politics” is not reducible to the symbolic quality expensive
consumer goods might have: in the end it does not matter what kind of objects
they re-arrange for their action to have affective force on their victims. Their
actions, in fact, have a leveling effect and point in the direction of deleting the
very difference between “symbolic” and “non-symbolic” objects.
24. The link between the way a virus operates and the politics of contemporary
terrorism has been established by Jean Baudrillard in The Spirit of Terrorism (10).
But Baudrillard still interprets suicidal terrorism exclusively from the perspective
of the politics of death (in other words, as he argues, in suicide death becomes a
form of resistance against biopower). Our interest, however, lies somewhere else,
as we aim to examine here a form of politics that is neither suicidal nor murderous
in nature and that instead turns life (rather than death) into a form of resistance to
biopower.
25. As Jan informs Jule (and us) in a brief sociological excursus, central
Europeans watch on average four hours of television per day. Consequently, “da
bleibt nicht mehr viel Zeit für revolutionäre Gedanken” ‘not much time for
revolutionary thoughts remains.’ Weingartner’s follow-up feature, Free Rainer—
Dein Fernseher lügt (Reclaim Your Brain, 2007), is a satirical indictment of the
role TV plays in our lives.
26. For the language of signaletic versus signifying, we are drawing here on the
work Marco Abel has done in Violent Affect: Literature, Cinema, and Critique
After Representation (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2007).
27. With the idea of the “radical inside,” we mean to refer once again to
Deleuze’s reading of Foucault. We understand this term here to refer to the
immanent outside that needs to be distinguished simultaneously from an
exteriority that supposedly transcends the inside as well as from a simple
interiority that defines the inside as a purely homogeneous domain.
28. In “Control and Becoming,” Deleuze writes the following: “Maybe speech
and communication have been corrupted. They’re thoroughly permeated by
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money—and not by accident but by their very nature. We’ve got to hijack speech.
Creating has always been something different from communicating. The key
thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can
elude control” (175).
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